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STATE OF UTAH 





BRIEF OF HESPONDENT 
Case No. 
11722 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, William Coleman, was charged with 
assault with intent to commit murder in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-30-1<1 (1953). The appellant appeals from 
his conviction of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon 
vdth intent to do bodily harm in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-7-6 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was found guilty after a jury trial of 
the crime of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to 
do bodily harm. The jury returned its verdict on April 18, 
1969. The trial was presided over by the Honorable Ed-
ward Sheya, Judge, Second Judicial District Court, in and 
for Weber County, State of Utah, who sentenced the appel-
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lant on the 8th day of .May, 1969, to a term not to exceed 
five years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the conviction of the ap-
pellant should be affirmed and asks this Court to hold that 
the trial court did not commit reversible error. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees with the statement of facts as 
set out in the appellant's brief on page. 3. It should be em-
phasized, however, that the appellant was charged with 
assault with intent to commit murder but was convicted 
of a lesser included offense, to-wit: assault with a deadly 
weapon with intent to do bodily harm. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT RE-
VERSIBLE ERROR BY INSTRUCTING THE 
JURY TO DISREGARD THE OPINIONS OF 
THE WITNESSES AND THE DEFENDANT. 
The respondent agrees with the appellant that the 
origin of jury Instruction No. 5 (R. 17) is found in the 
discussion between the trial court and counsel concerning 
a letter sent by the complaining witness, Linda Martin, to 
the appellant subsequent to the shooting and prior to the 
trial. The letter in question states what is obviously the 
oprnion of the complaining witness, i.e., that she felt the 
\\'a::; <m accident. The trial court correctly ruled 
that Martin's opinion as to what happened on the 
11i,ri1t in question \Vas immaterial and wonld not be par-"' 
ti<.:nlal"ly helpful to the jury. It is clear that neither an 
expc1t nor a non-expert witness is permitted to state the 
!eg;.,tl result or effect of a particular transaction. State v. 
Jf'[c0nitt. i88 l'.(ont. G<ti, :307 P. 2d G83 (1960). The instruc-
tio11 as it pertains to this particular complaining witness 
was, then, not error. The only other opinion testimony pre-
sented at the trial was that of Newell G. Knight (T. 235), 
a11d Ro,;coe E. Grover ( T. 249). 
The appellant's brief makes it clear that he is claiming 
enor on the ground that Instruction No. 5 is so broad that 
it exdudes from jury consideration the expert opinion tes-
timony of Mr. Knight and Mr. Grover. Newell Knight tes-
ti:ied as an expert on the physiological effects of alcohol, 
and Roscoe Grover testified as an expert on firearms (T. 
235; 249). Both were calleu as defense witnesses. The tes-
timony of Mr. Grover was mere speculation because the gun 
actually used by the defendant was not shown to be faulty. 
There was no showing that this witness had examined the 
gun used by the defendant, and the trial judge correctly 
pointed out that this witness testified only as to possibili-
ties ( T. 252). Even if the jury did disregard this testimony, 
the appellant would not be prejudiced thereby. This is 
especially true in light of the overwhelming testimony con-
necting the appellant to the crime. This Court cannot re-
verse for mere technicalities which do not affect the sub-
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stantial rights of the parties, Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 
(1953). 
The testimony of Mr. Knight concerned the effect of 
alcohol on the human body. His testimony was based on a 
formula whereby the size of the man and the amount of 
alcohol over a certain period of time are calculated (T. 
He testified that Mr. Coleman would probably have 
been impaired to some degree, but he was not sure just 
how much. The appellant cannot claim that the jury dis-
regarded Mr. Knight's testimony. The appellant was 
charged with intent to commit murder which carries a five 
to life penalty. The jury convicted the appellant of the 
lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon 
with intent to do bodily harm. The lesser offense imposes 
a penalty of not more than five years in the Utah State 
Prison. Evidently, the jury did not disregard Mr. Knight's 
testimony. Moreover, the judge instructed the jury on the 
effects of alcohol. 
"Our law provides that 'no act committed by 
a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication 
is less criminal by reason of his having been in such 
condition.' This means that such a condition, if 
shown by the evidence to have existed in the defen-
dant at the time when allegedly he committed the 
crime charged, is not of itself a defense. It may 
throw light on the occurrence and aid you in de-
termining what took place; but when a person in 
a state of intoxication, voluntarily produced in him-
self, commits a crime, the law does not permit him 
to use his own vice as a shelter against the normal, 
legal consequences of his conduct. 
5 
However, when the existence of any particular 
motive, purpose or intent is a necessary element to 
constitute a particular kind or degree of crime, the 
jury, in determining whether or not such motive, 
purpose or intent existed in the mind of the accused, 
must take into consideration the evidence offered to 
prove that the accused was intoxicated at the time 
when the crime allegedly was committed. 
This fact requires an inquiry into the state of 
mind under which the defendant committed the act 
charged, if he did commit it. In pursuing that in-
quiry, it is proper to consider whether he was in-
toxicated at the time of the alleged offense. The 
weight to be gi'ven the evidence on tha,t question and 
the S'ignificance to attach to it, in relation to all the 
othe1' evidence, are exclusively ivithin your province" 
(R. 17, Instruction No. 7). (Emphasis added.) 
This instruction shows that the judge's intention was 
not to instruct the jury to disregard the opinions of all the 
witnesses. In any event, Instruction No. 5 did not consti-
tute error in light of all the facts and circumstances pre-
sented in this brief. 
In this case, a reading of the entire record shows be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was properly 
convicted. Not only is there no reasonable doubt, there is 
no doubt at all. Several witnesses saw the appellant shoot 
the victim, Linda Martin. In fact, the defense counsel stip-
ulated that the appellant fired the gun which injured Miss 
in Sia,'.c v. l'aldez, 19 Utah 2d 426, 4:1'.2 P. :2d 
(1967), the court stated that once a fair trial has been 
afforded the appellant, and a verdict supported by the eri-
dence has been rendered, ·' ... the proceedings are 
to be valid; and V>'e ai·e not di.sposed to reverse for mere 
technicalities or inegulal'ities unless they put the defen-
dant at some snbslantial rl.isadvantage or had some material 
bearing on the fairness of the proceedings or its outcome." 
Id. at 429, 434 P. 2d at G5. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-4?.-1 (1953) is in accord: 
"After hearing an appeal, the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects which 
do not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
If error has been committed, it shall not be pre-
sumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court must 
be satisfied that it has that effect before it is war-
ranted in reversing the judgment." 
The appellant has failed to sho-w any substantial preju-
dice and therefore the presumption of validity must stand. 
The appellant was given a fair trial, and the jury rendered 
a guilty verdict supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
Notwithstanding Instruction No. 5, the appellant cannot 
claim prejudice because the jury returned a verdict of a 
lesser included offense. There is no other alternative but 
to conclude that this verdict was based upon the opinion 
testimony of Mr. Newell Knight. The jury did take into 
consideration his opinion on the effects of alcohol on the 
appellant. 
The Supreme Court has ruled that an error committed 
by the trial court does not constitute automatic reversal. 
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Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967); Harrington 
v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). 
"A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not 
a perfect one." Lutwak v. United States, 344 U. S. 
604 (1953). 
The substantial rights of the appellant were not af-
f ectecl in this case. 
POINT II. 
THE APPELLANT \VAS GIVEN A FAIR 
TRIAL AND WAS NOT DENIED DUE PRO-
CESS on EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW AT 
ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The appellant filed a pro se brief to this court in addi-
tion to the brief filed by his attorney. The respondent 
wishes to answer these arguments briefly. 
The appellant first claims that he was deprived of a 
separate hearing on the issue of sanity. The record makes 
it clear that the appellant was given a continuance so that 
he could obtain the services of a psychiatrist (R. 8). The 
appellant thereafter entered a plea of not guilty by reason 
of temporary insanity (R. 10). He was taken from the 
Weber County jail and transported to the Utah State Hos-
pital. Following an examination at the Hospital, Dr. Roger 
S. Kiger, M.D. and senior psychiatrist reported to Judge 
Norseth that the appellant was competent to stand trial 
(R. 11). No hearing need be held if the judge does not 
think it expedient. Utah Code Ann. § 78-48-4 ( 1953). Evi-
dently, there was no necessity for a hearing in this instance. 
The examin.'.lt1011 l·epo1t .sent to Mr. Coleman's attor. 
ney, and the appellant callnot claim a denial of due process 
on the basis that no c;anity hearmg was held. 
Secondly, the appellant clai111s that he was denied due 
prncess and equal protection of law because the trial court 
refused to provL1e him with a transcript of his trial. This 
is a factual question and not a prnper (1uesticn to be raisecl 
on appeal. In any event the appellant cannot claim preju-
dice even if no transcript was given to him personally. The 
appellant is having his case appealed at tl1is time. A record 
and transcript was prepared at Mr. Coleman's request (R. 
1-3). The Supreme Court also appointed Mr. Gerald G. 
Gundry to prepare a brief and argue Mr. Coleman's case 
before the court. Obviously, appellant's second point is 
without merit. 
The appellant also claims that he was denied the effec-
tive assistance of counsel. The record indicates, however, 
that Mr. Coleman was adequately represented throughout 
every critical proceeding. A Notice of Appeal was timely 
filed and appellant cannot claim prejudice. There has been 
no showing of ineffective counsel, and this court has no 
other alternative but to deny appellant's Point III of the 
pro se brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent asks this Court to affirm the judgment 
of the trial court and hold that the trial judge did not com-
mit reversihle error in giving Instruction No. 5. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
LAUREN N. BEASLEY 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
